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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1), which prohibits the
knowing provision of “any * * * service, * * * training, expert advice or assistance, * * * [or] personnel,”
18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(1), to a designated foreign terrorist
organization, violates the First and Fifth Amendments.
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JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
December 10, 2007. A petition for rehearing was denied
on January 5, 2009 (Pet. App. 2a-3a). On March 24,
2009, Justice Kennedy extended the time within which
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including
May 5, 2009. On April 22, 2009, Justice Kennedy further
extended the time to June 4, 2009, and the petition in
No. 08-1498 was filed on that date. A conditional crosspetition for a writ of certiorari was filed on July 6, 2009
(Monday). The petitions for writs of certiorari were
granted on September 30, 2009. The jurisdiction of this
Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that “Congress shall make
no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides in relevant part that “[n]o person
shall * * * be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” The pertinent statutory
provisions are reprinted in an appendix to this brief.
STATEMENT

1. This case involves a constitutional challenge to
provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214, that serve as crucial tools in America’s fight
against terrorism. The statute authorizes the Secretary
of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Trea-
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sury and the Attorney General, to designate an entity as
a “foreign terrorist organization” if she finds (1) that
“the organization is a foreign organization”; (2) that “the
organization engages in terrorist activity,” as defined in
8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B); and (3) that the organization’s
terrorist activity “threatens the security of United
States nationals or the national security of the United
States.” 8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(1) and (d)(4). An organization
may seek judicial review of its designation by filing a
petition for review in the District of Columbia Circuit.
8 U.S.C. 1189(c).
It is a criminal offense for any person within the
United States or subject to its jurisdiction “knowingly” to provide “material support or resources” to a
designated foreign terrorist organization. 18 U.S.C.
2339B(a)(1). The statute defines “material support or
resources” as
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training,
expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be
or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.
Ibid.
In the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6603(c),
118 Stat. 3762, Congress clarified several provisions of
Section 2339B. In particular, IRTPA specified that in
order to “knowingly” violate the material-support statute, a person “must have knowledge that the organiza-
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tion is a designated terrorist organization” or “that the
organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity.” 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1). Section 2339B thus prohibits a person with such knowledge from providing material support or resources to a designated terrorist organization.
IRTPA also amended the definition of “material support and resources” in four ways. First, it included
an additional ban on the knowing provision of any “service” to a designated terrorist organization. 18 U.S.C.
2339A(b)(1). Second, it defined the term “training”
to mean “instruction or teaching designed to impart a
specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge.”
18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(2). Third, it defined “expert advice
or assistance” to mean “advice or assistance derived
from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.” 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(3). Fourth, it placed strict
limits on prosecutions based on providing “personnel”:
No person may be prosecuted under this section in
connection with the term ‘personnel’ unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or
conspired to provide a foreign terrorist organization
with 1 or more individuals (who may be or include
himself) to work under that terrorist organization’s
direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely independently of
the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals
or objectives shall not be considered to be working
under the foreign terrorist organization’s direction
and control.
18 U.S.C. 2339B(h).
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Since 2001, the United States has charged approximately 150 defendants with violations of the materialsupport provision of 18 U.S.C. 2339B, and to date approximately 75 defendants have been convicted. Several
of those prosecutions have involved the provision of
“training,” “expert advice or assistance, “personnel,” or
“service” to terrorist organizations. See, e.g., [Superseding] Indictment at 4-5, United States v. Iqbal, No.
1:06-cr-01054 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 20, 2007) (defendants
were charged under Section 2339B with providing
satellite-television services to Hizballah; defendants
pleaded guilty); [Third Superseding] Indictment at 1-2,
United States v. Shah, 474 F. Supp. 2d 492 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (No. 1:05-cr-00673) (defendants were charged under Section 2339B with providing al Qaeda “martial arts
training and instruction”; one defendant pleaded guilty
and the other was found guilty after a jury trial). Some
of those cases have involved the provision of material
support to one of the terrorist organizations at issue
here.
See, e.g., United States v. Osman,
No. 1:06-cr-00416-CCB-1 (D. Md. Oct. 31, 2008); United
States v. Sarachandran, No. 1:06-cr-00615-RJD-1
(E.D.N.Y. guilty plea entered Jan. 26, 2009); United
States v. Thavaraja, No. 1:06-cr-00616-RJD-JO-1
(E.D.N.Y. guilty plea entered June 9, 2009).
2. The Secretary of State has designated the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers or LTTE) as foreign terrorist organizations. The PKK has never sought judicial
review of its designation. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
The LTTE sought judicial review, but the District of
Columbia Circuit upheld its designation. See People’s
Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. United States Dep’t of State,

6
182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1104
(2000).
a. The PKK was founded in 1974 for the purpose of
establishing an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey. Since its inception, the organization has
waged a violent insurgency that has claimed over 22,000
lives. In the 1990s, the PKK conducted terrorist attacks
on Turkish targets throughout Western Europe; it also
targeted areas of Turkey frequented by tourists. For
instance, in 1996, PKK members hijacked a bus in Turkey and kidnapped two passengers, one of whom was a
United States citizen. Earlier, the PKK claimed responsibility for a series of bombings in Istanbul that killed
two people and wounded at least ten others, including a
United States citizen. In 1993, the PKK firebombed five
sites in London. In a separate incident that year, it kidnapped tourists from the United States and New Zealand and held them hostage. J.A. 128-130.
b. The Tamil Tigers were founded in 1976 for the
purpose of creating an independent Tamil state in Sri
Lanka. J.A. 130. The organization has used suicide
bombings and political assassinations in its campaign for
independence, killing hundreds of civilians in the process. J.A. 130-133; see People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran,
182 F.3d at 19-20. In 1996, the Tamil Tigers exploded a
truck bomb at the Central Bank in Colombo, Sri Lanka,
killing 100 people and injuring more than 1400. J.A. 131.
The following year, the group exploded another truck
bomb near the World Trade Center in central Colombo,
injuring 100 people, including 7 United States citizens.
J.A. 130-131. In 1998, a Tamil Tiger suicide bomber
exploded a car bomb in Maradana, Sri Lanka, killing 37
people and injuring more than 238 others. J.A. 130. In
addition, throughout the 1990s, the Tamil Tigers carried
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out several attacks on Sri Lankan government officials,
killing the President, the Security Minister, and the
Deputy Defense Minister. J.A. 132.
3. Petitioners are two United States citizens and
five domestic organizations who wish to provide support
for what they say are lawful, nonviolent activities of the
PKK and the Tamil Tigers.1 Petitioners brought two
separate actions, eventually consolidated in the district
court, challenging the constitutionality of the materialsupport statute.
a. In the first action, petitioners raised several
constitutional challenges, including that the materialsupport statute impermissibly violates their First
Amendment association rights. The district court rejected that claim, noting that the statute does not directly target First Amendment interests because a terrorist designation is “not founded on the political viewpoints or subject matter that the organizations promote.
Rather, the designation is based on whether the organization engages in terrorist activity.” Humanitarian
Law Project, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1191. “More importantly,”
the court held, the material-support statute “does not
criminalize mere association with designated terrorist
organizations” and “does not prevent [petitioners] from

1

On September 30, 2009, the Court granted two petitions for a writ
of certiorari. In No. 08-1498, the governmental parties are the petitioners, and the private parties (who were plaintiffs in the district court) are
the respondents. In No. 09-89, the same private parties are the conditional cross-petitioners, and the governmental parties are the respondents. On November 2, 2009, the Court granted the parties’ joint motion to amend the briefing schedule, which provided that the private
parties would proceed as the petitioners and the governmental parties
would proceed as the respondents in both cases.
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affiliating with or advocating on behalf of the PKK or
LTTE.” Id. at 1191-1192.
The district court also rejected petitioners’ argument
that the statute violates their First Amendment speech
rights. The court began by stating that it would apply
intermediate scrutiny to the material-support statute
because its “restrictions are content-neutral and are
directed at the noncommunicative elements of [petitioners’] actions.” Humanitarian Law Project, 9 F. Supp.
2d at 1192. The statute survives that scrutiny, the court
concluded, because it is within the constitutional power
of the federal government to enact; it furthers an important and substantial government interest (protecting
national security); it is “not directed at suppressing [petitioners’] political speech or advocacy of the PKK’s and
LTTE’s political agenda,” but instead is “aimed at precluding material support to terrorist organizations that
divert funds raised for political and humanitarian resources to their terrorist activities”; and it “restricts [petitioners’] First Amendment freedoms no more than is
essential.” Id. at 1192-1195.
The district court, however, agreed with petitioners
that the terms “training” and “personnel,” as they were
then defined in the statute, were unconstitutionally
vague. Humanitarian Law Project, 9 F. Supp. 2d at
1203. On the basis of that holding, the court entered a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the government from
enforcing the terms “training” or “personnel” against
petitioners or their members. Id. at 1204-1205; Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1215
(C.D. Cal. 1998). The court of appeals affirmed the preliminary injunction on the same ground. Humanitarian
Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137-1138 (9th Cir.
2000). This Court denied interlocutory review of peti-
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tioners’ First Amendment claims. Humanitarian Law
Project v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904 (2001).
On remand, after both parties filed dispositive motions, the district court permanently enjoined enforcement of the terms “training” and “personnel” against
petitioners, again on vagueness grounds. No. CV-981971 ABC, 2001 WL 36105333. A panel of the court of
appeals affirmed that judgment as well. 352 F.3d 382.
After the IRTPA amendments became law, however,
the court granted the government’s petition for rehearing en banc, vacated the panel’s judgment insofar as it
had found the terms “training” and “personnel” unconstitutionally vague, and remanded to the district court
to consider the case in light of those amendments.
393 F.3d 902. The en banc court affirmed the district
court’s final judgment insofar as it had rejected petitioners’ other First Amendment challenges. Ibid.; see 352
F.3d at 393.
b. In the second action, petitioners focused on the
term “expert advice or assistance,” asserting that it too
violates their associational rights and is overbroad and
vague. The district court rejected petitioners’ attempt
to relitigate their associational claim. Humanitarian
Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1203
(C.D. Cal. 2004). The court also rejected their argument
that the term “expert advice or assistance” is overbroad,
explaining that the statute “is aimed at furthering a legitimate state interest” and that petitioners had “failed
to demonstrate” that its “application to protected speech
is ‘substantial’ both in an absolute sense and relative to
the scope of the law’s plainly legitimate applications.”
Id. at 1202-1203. But the court agreed with petitioners
that the term is vague. Id. at 1198-1201. It therefore
enjoined the government from enforcing the challenged
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provision against petitioners for any assistance to the
PKK and the LTTE. Id. at 1204. The court of appeals
subsequently vacated and remanded that judgment for
consideration of the IRTPA amendments. Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, No. 04-55871 (9th Cir. Apr.
1, 2005).
c. Both remanded cases were consolidated before
the district court, where petitioners asserted that the
terms “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” and
“personnel” are unconstitutionally vague, even as
amended and clarified by IRTPA. Petitioners also argued that the term “service”—which IRTPA had added
to the definition of “material support or resources”—is
impermissibly vague. The district court agreed with
those claims, except as to “personnel” and “expert advice or assistance” in the form of “scientific [or] technical . . . knowledge.” Pet. App. 62a-69a & n.23. The
court again enjoined the government from enforcing the
challenged provisions against petitioners for support
given to the PKK and the LTTE. Id. at 75a.
4. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 1a-32a.
As a threshold matter, the court of appeals agreed
that “there is no Fifth Amendment due process violation.” Pet. App. 19a. The court explained that in enacting IRTPA, “Congress could have, but chose not to, impose a requirement that the defendant act with the specific intent to further the terrorist activity of [a designated] organization.” Id. at 18a. Rather, Congress required only “knowledge that the donee organization is a
designated foreign terrorist organization” or “knowledge that the organization is or has engaged in terrorist
activities or terrorism.” Id. at 15a-16a (citing 18 U.S.C.
2339B(a); emphasis omitted). The court concluded that
“acting with ‘knowledge’ satisfies the requirement of
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‘personal guilt’ and eliminates any due process concerns.” Id. at 17a.
Turning to petitioners’ vagueness challenge, the
court of appeals held that the term “training” is unconstitutionally vague. Pet. App. 20a-23a. The court considered it “highly unlikely that a person of ordinary
intelligence would know whether, when teaching someone to petition international bodies for [humanitarian]
aid, one is imparting a ‘specific skill’ or ‘general knowledge.’ ” Id. at 21a-22a. In addition, “[e]ven if persons of
ordinary intelligence could discern between the instruction that imparts a ‘specific skill,’ as opposed to one that
imparts ‘general knowledge,’ ” the court stated that “the
term ‘training’ could still be read to encompass speech
and advocacy protected by the First Amendment.” Id.
at 22a. The court concluded that the term “training” is
vague “because it ‘implicates, and potentially chills, [petitioners’] protected expressive activities.’ ” Id. at 22a-23a
(quoting id. at 64a).
The court of appeals also held that the term “expert
advice or assistance” is unconstitutionally vague.
Pet. App. 23a-24a. The court noted that the statute’s
definition of “expert advice or assistance” as “advice or
assistance derived from scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge,” 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(3), was borrowed from Federal Rule of Evidence 702. But that borrowing, the court stated, “does not clarify the term ‘expert advice or assistance’ for the average person with no
background in law.” Pet. App. 24a (quoting id. at 66a).
In particular, the court concluded that “the ‘other specialized knowledge’ portion of the ban” would “cover
constitutionally protected advocacy.” Ibid. By contrast,
the court held that the provision was not vague insofar
as it reached “scientific [or] technical * * * knowl-
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edge,” because “the meaning of ‘technical’ and ‘scientific’
is reasonably understandable to a person of ordinary
intelligence.” Ibid. (quoting id. at 66a).
Similarly, the court of appeals held that the term
“service” is unconstitutionally vague. Pet. App. 25a.
According to the court, “each of the other challenged
provisions could be construed as a provision of ‘service.’”
Ibid. For instance, the court stated, “[t]he term ‘service’
presumably includes providing members of PKK and
LTTE with ‘expert advice or assistance’ on how to lobby
or petition representative bodies such as the United Nations” and includes “ ‘training’ members of PKK or
LTTE on how to use humanitarian and international law
to peacefully resolve ongoing disputes.” Ibid. The court
also concluded that “it is easy to imagine protected expression that falls within the bounds” of that term. Ibid.
(quoting id. at 67a).
The court of appeals held, however, that the term
“personnel” is not vague. Pet. App. 26a-27a. The court
noted that, as a result of IRTPA, the statute “criminalizes providing ‘personnel’ to a foreign terrorist organization only where a person, alone or with others, ‘[work]s
under that terrorist organization’s direction or control
or . . . organize[s], manage[s], supervise[s], or otherwise direct[s] the operation of that organization.’ ” Id. at
26a (brackets in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 2339B(h)).
As amended, the court held, the term is not vague because it “no longer criminalizes pure speech protected
by the First Amendment.” Id. at 26a-27a.
Finally, the court of appeals rejected petitioners’
claim that the material-support statute is overbroad.
Pet. App. 27a-29a. The court noted that because the
statute is “aimed * * * at stopping aid to terrorist
groups,” and “is not aimed primarily at speech, an
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overbreadth challenge is more difficult to show.” Id. at
28a. Moreover, the court found that the statute’s “ban
on provision of ‘material support or resources’ to designated foreign terrorist organizations undoubtably has
many legitimate applications,” such as criminalizing the
provision of “income, weapons, or expertise in constructing explosive devices.” Ibid. “[A]lthough [petitioners]
may be able to identify particular instances of protected
speech that may fall within the statute,” the court
concluded, “those instances are not substantial when
compared to the legitimate applications of [S]ection
2339B(a).” Id. at 29a.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. A. The material-support statute is not void for
vagueness under the Fifth Amendment. As a threshold
matter, the statute requires that a person “knowingly
provide[] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.” 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1). A defendant therefore must know that the recipient of his proffered aid has been designated as a terrorist organization
or engages in terrorist activity. That express scienter
requirement diminishes any vagueness concerns. Moreover, a defendant must direct his aid to a foreign terrorist organization. The statute does not prohibit independent advocacy or expression of any kind. What it
prohibits is the separate act of rendering assistance to
foreign terrorists, whether that assistance takes the
form of money or other property or a “service” such as
“training,” “expert advice or assistance,” or “personnel.”
18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(1).
The challenged terms rest on simple distinctions that
are readily understood by persons of ordinary intelligence. The term “training” is defined as imparting a
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specific skill rather than general knowledge, and the
term “expert advice or assistance” is similarly defined
as imparting scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge. Ordinary individuals understand the difference
between what is commonly known and what is not. The
term “personnel” is defined as persons who either supervise or work under the direction or control of a foreign terrorist organization, and the term “service” refers to action taken for the direct benefit of a foreign
terrorist organization. Again, ordinary citizens understand the difference inherent in these definitions between concerted and independent action.
The statute is not vague simply because application
of these terms to particular actions may sometimes be
difficult. Vagueness lies not in occasional uncertainty
about whether an incriminating fact has been proved,
but in fundamental indeterminacy about what that fact
is. See United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1846
(2008). For that reason, courts have routinely upheld
the challenged terms, which appear in thousands of statutes throughout the United States Code, as sufficiently
clear to provide fair notice of what conduct the law prohibits. Moreover, petitioners challenge the statute only
as applied to their own conduct, all of which falls
squarely within any interpretation of the terms “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “personnel,” or “service.” Application of the statute to petitioners’ proposed
activities thus presents no constitutional difficulties.
Indeed, petitioners have consistently used those very
terms to describe their proposed activities.
B. The court of appeals enjoined enforcement of
the terms “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” and
“service” because, in its view, those terms could be read
to encompass independent advocacy. But the material-
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support statute is not reasonably read to cover—and in
the face of any constitutional doubt should not be read
to cover—independent advocacy. In any event, suppressing such advocacy would make the statute unconstitutional as applied, not vague. The court of appeals
erred by conflating petitioners’ overbreadth claim under
the First Amendment with their vagueness claim under
the Fifth Amendment.
II. The material-support statute does not violate
the First Amendment. Contrary to petitioners’ claims,
the statute is a regulation of conduct, only incidentally
affecting speech and applying irrespective of any expressive content; it is therefore subject to intermediate
scrutiny under United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968). The statute easily survives such scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to advance important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of petitioners’ expression. Nor is the statute substantially
overbroad: the vast bulk of the statute’s applications,
involving such matters as the provision of money and
weapons to terrorist organizations, are not even arguably problematic. Finally, the statute does not infringe
associational rights, because it does not prevent petitioners from joining or otherwise associating with foreign terrorist organizations. For those reasons, the
lower courts, including the courts below, have uniformly
upheld the statute against First Amendment challenge.
III. Petitioners argue that, as a matter of constitutional avoidance, the material-support statute should be
interpreted to require specific intent to further a terrorist organization’s unlawful activities. That argument is
waived, futile, and incorrect. Petitioners raise their current avoidance argument for the first time before this
Court; construing the statute to require specific intent
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would not avoid resolution of petitioners’ constitutional
claims; and Congress expressly rejected such a specificintent requirement.
ARGUMENT

Petitioners raise a host of challenges to the materialsupport statute. They contend that the statute is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment because it is
overly vague (Br. 25-42) and under the First Amendment because it impermissibly discriminates on the
basis of content (Br. 43-55), because it is overbroad
(Br. 42-43), and because it violates their right to associate with designated terrorist organizations (Br. 56-59).
The court of appeals correctly rejected petitioners’ arguments regarding content-based discrimination,
overbreadth, and associational rights, but erred in partially accepting petitioners’ due process challenge. The
material-support statute provides persons of ordinary
intelligence with reasonably clear, and therefore constitutionally sufficient, notice of the types of direct aid that
it prohibits. The court of appeals thus erred by partially
invalidating one of this nation’s most valuable and vital
tools in the fight against international terrorism.
I.

THE MATERIAL-SUPPORT STATUTE’S RESTRICTIONS
ON PROVIDING AID TO KNOWN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS DO NOT VIOLATE THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. The Statute’s Terms Are Sufficiently Clear To Provide
Notice To Persons Of Ordinary Intelligence

The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires
that a criminal statute be sufficiently clear to give a person of “ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited.” Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). The Clause does not require
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that an offense be defined with “mathematical certainty,” id. at 110, but only that it give “relatively clear
guidelines as to prohibited conduct,” Posters ‘N’ Things,
Ltd . v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525 (1994). The
statutory definition of “material support” in 18 U.S.C.
2339A(b)(1) readily satisfies that standard.
As a threshold matter, this Court should apply the
vagueness standard that it typically uses in cases involving the application of statutes defining criminal offenses.
Petitioners at times appear to argue otherwise, contending that the material-support statute is “subject to the
most stringent vagueness scrutiny” in part because it
“trench[es] on speech and associational rights.” Br.
25-26. But this Court has never suggested that a statute
aimed at regulating conduct regardless of its expressive
content—i.e., the provision of aid to terrorist organizations—triggers a heightened need for legislative precision, just because it incidentally captures some expressive activity. As discussed further in Part II.A, the
material-support statute is not targeted at speech, still
less at any particular message, and petitioners may accordingly express any views they wish about the PKK,
LTTE, or any other terrorist organization. The statute
simply prevents petitioners from contributing resources
of various kinds that further those groups’ activities.
Such a prohibition is not subject to any special vagueness standard.
Petitioners’ request for heightened scrutiny is particularly inappropriate in this context, because Congress
crafted the statute to minimize even incidental interference with First Amendment freedoms. For example,
Congress included a scienter requirement, which serves
to “mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to
the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his con-
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duct is proscribed.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982);
see id. at 499 n.14 (citing cases). As the court of appeals
explained, the statute at issue requires “that the donor
defendant provided ‘material support or resources’
* * * with knowledge that the donee organization is a
designated foreign terrorist organization, or with knowledge that the organization is or has engaged in terrorist
activities or terrorism.” Pet. App. 15a-16a. That scienter requirement helps to remove any potential vagueness problem by preventing application of the statute to
innocent conduct, including any with an expressive component.
In any event, the material-support statute meets
even the vagueness standard that the Court has employed in cases involving speech restrictions. This Court
has repeatedly observed that “perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity.” Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989); see Williams,
128 S. Ct. at 1845; Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 740
(2000) (Souter, J., concurring). Petitioners here identify
four components of the definition of material support
that they consider impermissibly vague: “training,”
“expert advice or assistance,” “personnel,” and “service.” In fact, each of those terms is sufficiently clear to
give persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what
the statute prohibits.
Still more importantly, there is no difficulty in applying the material-support statute to the facts of this case.
Petitioners here do not challenge the statute on its face.
Rather, they claim that, “as applied to their proposed
speech, the challenged provisions are intolerably vague.”
Br. 4; id. at 25 (“The provisions are vague as applied to
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plaintiffs’ intended speech.”) (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, the court of appeals addressed only an as-applied vagueness challenge, see Pet. App. 22a n.6, and
that is the only challenge before this Court. Petitioners’
claim thus depends on whether ordinary persons would
understand how the statute applies not to petitioners’
fanciful hypotheticals, but to their own proposed conduct. See Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495
(“A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law
as applied to the conduct of others.”); Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974) (“One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for
vagueness.”). And in fact all of petitioners’ proposed
activities fall squarely within the ordinary meaning of
the statute’s terms. The clarity of the statute as applied
in this case is fatal to petitioners’ claim of vagueness.
1. Instructing the PKK and LTTE on how to engage in
international political advocacy constitutes “training”

a. Even before Congress clarified the definition of
“training” by enacting IRTPA in 2004, the meaning of
that term was clear and readily intelligible to the average person. “Train” is defined as “to teach or exercise
(someone) in an art, profession, trade, or occupation,” to
“direct in attaining a skill,” or to “give instruction to.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the
English Language 2424 (1993) (Webster’s); see The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
1830 (4th ed. 2006) (American Heritage) (defining
“train” as “[t]o make proficient with specialized instruction and practice”); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1326 (11th ed. 2005) (Merriam-Webster’s) (de-
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fining “train” as “to form by instruction, discipline, or
drill” or “to teach so as to make fit, qualified, or proficient”); The Random House Dictionary of the English
Language 2007 (2d ed. 1987) (Random House) (defining
“train” as “to make proficient by instruction and practice, as in some art, profession, or work”).
As courts have recognized, an ordinary person would
readily understand those concepts. See California
Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141,
1151 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “instruction” is a
“word[] of common understanding” and is not unconstitutionally vague). Indeed, a host of federal statutes use
the term “training” in a similar manner to Section
2339A(b)(1).2 Despite the thousands of references to the
term “training” in the United States Code, petitioners
2

See 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (prohibiting aliens from providing material support, including “training,” to terrorists); 22 U.S.C.
7423(e) and 7432(12) (prohibiting any federal, state, or local governmental agency or entity from providing support, including “the training
or detail of personnel,” to the International Criminal Court); see also
5 U.S.C. 4103(a) (requiring federal agencies to establish plans “for the
training of employees”); 15 U.S.C. 3116 (requiring the Secretary of
Labor to “assure the availability of counseling, training, and other support activities” for the unemployed); 20 U.S.C. 954a(b) (authorizing the
National Endowment for the Arts in various ways “to support the education, training, and development of this Nation’s artists”); 22 U.S.C.
2770a(a) (providing that “the President may provide training and related support to military and civilian defense personnel of a friendly foreign country or an international organization”); 42 U.S.C. 9840a (providing for “ongoing training and technical assistance” to Early Head
Start agencies); 42 U.S.C. 15025 (providing that federal assistance to
designated state agencies “may support and conduct training for persons who are individuals with developmental disabilities”). The term
“training” even appears in the United States Constitution, which
reserves to the States “the Authority of training the Militia according
to the discipline prescribed by Congress.” Art. I, § 8, Cl. 16.
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do not point to any authority for the proposition that
terms like “training,” “instruction,” or “teaching” are
impermissibly vague.
In fact, petitioners’ own statements belie their argument. The term “training” is sufficiently intelligible
that petitioners repeatedly use it to describe their proposed activities. See Br. 10 (“Prior to AEDPA’s enactment, the HLP and Judge Fertig had been assisting the
PKK by training them in how to bring human rights
complaints to the United Nations.”); J.A. 81 (original
complaint; alleging that HLP and Judge Fertig “would
like to * * * provide the PKK and the Kurds with
training * * * on how to engage in political advocacy
on their own behalf and on how to use international law
to seek redress for human rights violations”); J.A. 58-59
(amended complaint; same). As petitioners’ statements
demonstrate, average persons understand that instructing groups like PKK and the LTTE on “how to engage
in political advocacy” and “how to use international law
to seek redress for human rights violations” falls within
the commonly accepted meaning of the term “training.”
b. Even if the term “training” were not sufficiently
intelligible standing alone, Congress further defined
that term in IRTPA to include “instruction or teaching
designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general
knowledge.” 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(2). Contrary to the
court of appeals’ conclusion, Pet. App. 21a-22a, that definition is clear on its face: a person of ordinary intelligence is capable of distinguishing between what is commonly or generally known and what is not. See Pierce
v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572 (1988) (distinguishing
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“some distinctive knowledge or specialized [litigation]
skill” from “general lawyerly knowledge”).3
Moreover, the material-support statute only prohibits imparting a specific skill “to a foreign terrorist organization.” 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1) (emphasis added). The
statute thus prohibits support that is channeled to a foreign terrorist organization, and excludes all advocacy or
expression that occurs independently of such an organization. See Webster’s 2401 (defining “to” as “a function
word to indicate movement * * * toward * * * a
place, person, or thing that is reached”). Indeed, that
limitation is inherent in the notion of “training” itself.
See id. at 2424 (defining “train” as “to teach or exercise
(someone) in an art, profession, trade, or occupation”)
(emphasis added). Petitioners themselves recognize
that limitation. See Br. 46 (“Here, the statute flatly
bans certain kinds of speech to designated organizations, e.g., training of or advising their members.”). Accordingly, a defendant provides “training” within the
meaning of the material-support statute only if he endeavors to impart a specific skill to people whom he
knows to be members of a foreign terrorist organization.4
3

The Sentencing Guidelines make a similar distinction between specialized and general skills. All criminal defendants, not simply those
convicted pursuant to the material-support statute, are subject to a twolevel increase in their offense level if they “use[] a special skill, in a
manner that significantly facilitate[s] the commission or concealment
of the offense.” Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.3. A “special skill” is defined, in turn, as “a skill not possessed by members of the general public and usually requiring substantial education, training or licensing.”
Id. § 3B1.3, comment. (n.4).
4
Petitioners quote (Br. 28) portions of a colloquy with the government’s counsel before the district court. In context, the government explained, as it has throughout this litigation, that the material-support

23
Petitioners argue that the distinction between general knowledge and specific skills is “inescapabl[y]
vague[].” Br. 27. The sole legal support that petitioners
advance for that proposition is Gentile v. State Bar,
501 U.S. 1030 (1991), in which this Court found impermissibly vague a state ethical rule limiting an attorney,
in his communications to the public, to stating “without
elaboration . . . the general nature of the . . . defense,” id. at 1048. Petitioners’ argument would suggest
that any federal statute distinguishing between the general and the specific is subject to a possible vagueness
challenge. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 1828(l) (referring to “general or specific regulation”); 22 U.S.C. 7611(b)(3)(A)
(same; “general and specific” objectives); 25 U.S.C.
2218(g) (same; “any general or specific statute”);
47 U.S.C. 504(a) (same; “other general or specific penalties”). But that proposition cannot be correct, and indeed Gentile is different from this case in two critical
respects.
First, Gentile arose from regulation of “classic political speech,” at “the very center of the First Amendment.” 501 U.S. at 1034. By contrast, this case involves
a generally applicable, content-neutral regulation of
conduct. See pp. 44-48, infra. Second, and even more
important, the state ethics rule in Gentile employed
terms (e.g., “general nature” and “elaboration”) with “no
settled usage or tradition of interpretation” in the particular context. 501 U.S. at 1048-1049. The rule thus
required “wholly subjective judgments” about when atstatute requires action taken “at the behest [of]” or “at the direction
and control” of a terrorist organization. C.A. Supp. E.R. 217; id. at 221
(“Training is a matter of are you providing it to a foreign terrorist
organization or not.”); id. at 224-225. The statute prohibits only activity
taken in concert with a terrorist organization.
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torneys had said too much—judgments that could not be
guided by “statutory definitions, narrowing context, or
settled legal meanings.” Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1846.
By contrast, in this context the distinction between
“a specific skill” and “general knowledge” has a settled
usage, see Pierce, 487 U.S. at 572, as well as a legal analogue in the sentencing context, see p. 22 n.3, supra.
The statute uses a “term[] of degree,” Gentile, 501 U.S.
at 1049, but in a way and in a context that supplies guidance in determining what that term means. Cf. James
v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 210 n.6 (2007) (holding
that the term “serious potential risk” is not impermissibly vague); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 449 (1947) (same; “substantiality”). Moreover, the ethics rule in Gentile lacked any
scienter requirement, and therefore failed to screen out
defendants who could not discern the lawfulness of their
statements even after “a conscious effort at compliance.”
501 U.S. at 1051. Here, there is little danger that a defendant will inadvertently train foreign terrorists in specific skills.5

5

Petitioners posit (Br. 27-28) a hypothetical course in geoscience or
geopolitics offered to members of the PKK or LTTE. The hypothetical
is drawn from a colloquy with the government’s counsel at oral argument before the en banc court of appeals. Counsel correctly explained
that, as amended, the material-support statute prohibits instructing
members of terrorist organizations in specific scientific or political
skills. See United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Media
for Case: Humanitarian Law Pro v. Gonzales, No. 02-55082 (Dec. 14,
2004) <http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=
0000004506> (50:40-51:20). Geoscience and geopolitics are types of specialized knowledge not held by members of the general public, and instruction in them requires substantial education or training. As counsel
further explained, the ability to hypothesize cases that test the boun-
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Of course, there may be hard cases in which people
can reasonably debate whether a particular type of instruction imparts a specific skill, but that occasional difficulty does not render the statute vague. This Court
has repeatedly observed that “[c]lose cases can be imagined under virtually any statute,” and “the mere fact
that close cases can be envisioned” does not indicate that
a statute is unconstitutionally vague. Williams, 128
S. Ct. at 1846; Hill, 530 U.S. at 733 (“[T]here is little
doubt that imagination can conjure up hypothetical
cases in which the meaning of these terms will be in nice
question.”) (quoting American Commc’ns Ass’n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950)). Determining whether
a defendant’s instruction imparted a specific skill is no
more difficult, as a factual matter, than determining
whether a defendant believed or intended others to believe that material was child pornography, Williams,
128 S. Ct. at 1846, or determining whether a defendant
made a noise or diversion that tended to disturb the
peace or good order of a school, Grayned, 408 U.S. at
110-111. The point for vagueness purposes is that an
ordinary person would understand what it means to instruct terrorist organizations in a specific skill.
c. Still more critically, an ordinary person would
understand how this provision of the material-support
statute applies to the particular facts of this case. Petitioners seek to “provide the PKK and the Kurds with
training and written publications on how to engage in
political advocacy on their own behalf and on how to use
international law to seek redress for human rights violations.” J.A. 59. Teaching the PKK and LTTE “how to
dary between general and specialized knowledge does not render the
statute vague. Ibid. (51:50-52:22, 54:23-54:44).
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petition for relief before representative bodies like the
United Nations,” Pet. App. 35a, is designed to impart a
specific skill: a person of ordinary intelligence would
understand that the skill of international political advocacy requires more than general knowledge. As evidence of that common understanding, at oral argument
before the en banc court of appeals, petitioners’ counsel
twice referred to the “human rights advocacy training”
that petitioners hope to provide, see United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Media for Case:
Humanitarian Law Pro v. Gonzales, No. 02-55082 (Dec.
14, 2004) <http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_
subpage.php?pk_id=0000004506> (Media for Case)
(8:45, 9:57), making clear that such instruction concerns
a specialized subject matter and skill set.
Indeed, at every opportunity throughout this litigation, petitioners have represented that they want to instruct the PKK and LTTE not on abstract or academic
subjects but on a specific skill: how to petition international bodies like the United Nations more effectively.
Petitioners may not believe such activity to be harmful,
but they must understand, as all reasonable observers
would, that the activity is covered by the statute’s terms.
Petitioners’ proposed activity falls within the category
of aid to terrorist organizations that Congress sought to
prohibit. Because the material-support statute is clear
as applied to petitioners’ intended activities, the Court
need not consider whether the statute might be vague as
applied to others’ hypothetical activities. See Village of
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495; Levy, 417 U.S. at 756.
The clarity of the statute as applied to petitioners’ own
conduct is fatal to their claim of vagueness.
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2. Consulting with the PKK and LTTE on international
law, medical care, and economic development constitutes “expert advice or assistance”

a. Petitioners also contend (Br. 29-33) that the
phrase “expert advice or assistance” is unconstitutionally vague. They do not dispute that they want to provide “advice or assistance” to the PKK and LTTE.
Rather, they claim that they are “force[d] * * * to
guess whether any aspect of their advice” is expert in
nature. Br. 29. But the term “expert” has a clearly understood meaning to the average person, referring to
special skills or knowledge. See Webster’s 800 (defining
“expert” as “having special skill or knowledge derived
from training or experience”); Merriam-Webster’s 440
(same); see also American Heritage 625 (defining “expert” as “[h]aving, involving, or demonstrating great
skill, dexterity, or knowledge as the result of experience
or training”); Random House 681 (defining “expert” as
“possessing special skill or knowledge; trained by practice; skillful or skilled”).
For that reason, courts have never had any difficulty
in determining the ordinary meaning of the term “expert.” See, e.g., United States v. Moses, 137 F.3d 894,
899 (6th Cir. 1998) (construing the term “expert testimony” in 18 U.S.C. 3509(b)(1)(B)(ii) to mean testimony
by a “person with a high degree of skill or knowledge of
a certain subject”) (quoting The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 645 (3d ed. 1992));
United States v. Alves, 317 F. Supp. 2d 65, 68 (D. Mass.
2004) (construing the term “expert or other services” to
include “[t]he services of an immigration counsel”). Like
the term “training,” the term “expert” appears through-

28
out the United States Code, and petitioners do not point
to any authority finding the term vague in any context.6
Notably, petitioners again do not seem to believe
their own argument. The term “expert” is sufficiently
intelligible that petitioners consistently have used it to
describe their past and proposed future activities.
J.A. 56 (“Since 1991, the HLP and Judge Fertig have
devoted a substantial amount of time and resources
* * * to working with and providing training, expert
advice and other forms of support to the PKK in its efforts to protect the Kurds from human rights abuses.”);
J.A. 60 (“The Sangam and its members wish to offer
their expert medical advice and assistance * * * by
consulting with the LTTE on how the health care system
in Tamil Eelam can be improved.”); J.A. 61 (“The WTCC
and its members wish to provide expert advice and assistance to the LTTE.”); J.A. 62 (“Many members of
FETNA wish to provide their expert advice and assistance to the Tamils.”); ibid. (“The THWRC and its members wish to provide expert advice and assistance to the
LTTE.”).

6

See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 3323(d) (authorizing the Chief of Engineers of the
Army to employ retired employees “whose expert assistance is needed
in connection with river and harbor or flood control works”); 5 U.S.C.
App. 2(a) at 455 (finding that federal advisory committees furnish “useful and beneficial * * * expert advice” to the federal government);
6 U.S.C. 236(e)(2)(A) (requiring that certain employees of the Department of Homeland Security provide types of “expert advice and training to consular officers”); 10 U.S.C. 373(2) (authorizing the Secretary
of Defense to provide federal, state and local law enforcement officials
with certain kinds of “expert advice”); 42 U.S.C. 6864a(b)(3) (authorizing the Secretary of Energy to provide financial assistance for “expert
advice” related to energy efficiency improvements in low-income housing).

29
b. The clarity of “expert advice or assistance” has
only been enhanced by IRTPA, which further defines it
to mean “advice or assistance derived from scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge.” 18 U.S.C.
2339A(b)(3). That definition is taken from Federal Rule
of Evidence 702, which permits expert witnesses to offer
testimony based on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” This Court explained in Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), that the
category of scientific, technical, and other specialized
knowledge consists of “specialized observations, the specialized translation of those observations into theory, a
specialized theory itself, or the application of such a theory in a particular case”—all of which often rest on experiences “foreign in kind” to those of the population in
general. Id. at 149 (citation omitted). Once again, an
ordinary person can readily distinguish between common knowledge and specialized knowledge foreign to the
experiences of most people.
The court of appeals believed that the origins of the
phrase “expert advice or assistance” in Rule 702 did not
clarify the statute “for the average person with no background in law.” Pet. App. 24a (quoting id. at 66a). Similarly, petitioners argue that Rule 702 is designed for use
by “trained judges,” not the “general public.” Br. 33.
But this Court’s interpretation of Rule 702 has been
based on the ordinary meaning of the rule’s words, not
on obscure legal arcana. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-590 (1993) (citing dictionary definition of “knowledge”). The average person
need not know anything about Rule 702 or about the
relationship between Rule 702 and the phrase “expert
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advice or assistance” in order to understand the meaning of that term.7
The court’s analysis is particularly puzzling because
it held that part of the phrase—namely, “scientific [or]
technical * * * knowledge”—is not vague, while the
immediately following phrase “other specialized knowledge” is vague. Pet. App. 24a. But under the principle
of ejusdem generis, “other specialized knowledge” takes
its meaning from the preceding (concededly non-vague)
terms “scientific” and “technical.” See Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-115 (2001). Indeed, “the average person with no background in law,”
Pet. App. 24a (quoting id. at 66a), would not need to be
familiar with “such Latin phrases as ejusdem generis
and noscitur a sociis to reach [the] obvious conclusion”
that “words grouped in a list should be given related
meaning,” Third Nat’l Bank v. Impac Ltd., 432 U.S. 312,
322-323 & n.16 (1977) (citation omitted). An ordinary
person would understand that the entire phrase —“scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge”—refers to knowledge relating to subject matter and based
on experiences not usually possessed or shared by the
general public.
c. Petitioners claim (Br. 29) that they cannot know
whether “advice or assistance” is “derived from scien7

In any event, the court of appeals’ criticism rests on a misunderstanding of the vagueness standard. Many terms used in criminal
statutes, such as “malice aforethought” or “conspiracy,” are not fully
intelligible as a matter of ordinary English but are nevertheless enforceable because they have determinate meanings in the law. See
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (“[W]here Congress borrows terms of art” with an established legal meaning, “it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to
each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken.”).
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tific, technical or other specialized knowledge,”
18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(3), because “all knowledge might be
thought” to do so, Br. 29. But that is an absurd reading
of the statute: if Congress had intended to refer to the
entirety of human knowledge, it would not have added
the words “scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge.” For the same reason that Congress expressly excluded general knowledge from the definition
of “training,” Congress required “expert advice or assistance” to be based on or drawn from a body of scientific,
technical or specialized knowledge—as when, for example, a banker provides advice on laundering money or a
chemist provides advice on manufacturing biological
weapons. Just as an ordinary person would understand
the difference between specific skills and general knowledge, see pp. 21-22, supra, so too he would appreciate
when advice is derived from specialized rather than general knowledge.
Petitioners fall back (Br. 30) on the claim that even
the terms “scientific” and “technical” are vague. But
nothing in this Court’s precedents supports a vagueness
challenge to words of this kind, whose core meanings are
objective and readily understood. This Court has found
vagueness in words like “annoy[ing],” Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971), or “[i]ndecent,”
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870-871 & n.35 (1997), because they require “wholly subjective judgments,” Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1846. By contrast, the use of terms
like “scientific” and “technical” rests on factual determinations—i.e., whether knowledge is specific, practical,
and related to a particular branch of science or a profession. See Webster’s 2348 (defining “technical” as “having special usu[ally] practical knowledge esp[ecially] of
a mechanical or scientific subject”). Petitioners focus
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(Br. 32) on less common, alternative definitions of the
words, without explaining why Congress would have
resorted to those less familiar meanings.
To be sure, “it may be difficult in some cases to determine” whether knowledge is scientific or technical, Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1846, but “courts and juries every
day pass upon” precisely that type of factual question,
ibid. (quoting Douds, 339 U.S. at 411). Once again, the
ability to devise close hypothetical cases does not render
Section 2339A(b)(3)’s requirement indeterminate.
Moreover, terms like “scientific” and “technical” have a
settled legal meaning, see Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at
148-149, and Congress used them in a context that provides further indication of their scope. The definition of
“material support and resources” includes “false documentation or identification, communications equipment,
* * * weapons, lethal substances, [and] explosives.”
18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(1). That list demonstrates the types
of “scientific” and “technical” “advice or assistance” that
concerned Congress.
Petitioners argue (Br. 30) that general knowledge
may once have been scientific, technical, or specialized
knowledge that has since been dispersed to the public.
But a term is not vague just because its coverage may
change over time. No doubt the Copernican theory once
rested with a handful of astronomers, whereas now is a
matter of common knowledge. But that progression
does not render Section 2339B(a)(1) vague, because it
requires that the expert advice or assistance be derived
from specialized knowledge at the time a person “knowingly provides [it] to a foreign terrorist organization.”
What matters is that divulging that the planets orbit the
sun does not now count as “expert advice.” Petitioners
similarly argue (Br. 31) that whether knowledge is spe-
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cialized depends on the level of sophistication of the recipient. But the proper test looks to the general public,
not the particular recipient of the advice or assistance.
Advice on encrypting communications becomes no more
general because the recipients are experienced software
programmers. In the analogous context of interpreting
“specialized knowledge” under Rule 702, this Court has
looked to whether the knowledge is foreign to the experiences of jurors, Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 149, who
are themselves “drawn from a fair cross section of the
community,” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527
(1975).
d. And again, critically, the term “expert advice or
assistance” is not vague as applied in this case, even if it
conceivably could be vague as applied in some other.
Petitioners seek to advise the PKK and LTTE on “how
to bring human rights complaints to the United Nations.” Br. 10; see J.A. 59 (alleging that petitioners want
to advise “on how to engage in political advocacy on
their own behalf and on how to use international law to
seek redress for human rights violations”). Petitioners
also seek to “assist[]” the PKK and LTTE “in peace negotiations.” Br. 10; see J.A. 59 (alleging that petitioners
want to “assist PKK members at peace conferences and
other meetings designed to support a peaceful resolution
of the Turkish conflict”). Petitioners further seek to
provide “expert medical advice and assistance,” J.A. 60;
“expert advice on how to improve the delivery of health
care, with a special focus on the area of otolaryngology,”
J.A. 61; and “expert advice and assistance” “in the fields
of politics, law, and economic development,” ibid., and
“information technology,” J.A. 62.
Advice in each of those subject matters requires specialized, practical knowledge that is the result of sub-
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stantial education or training. A person of ordinary intelligence would understand that all of these forms of
assistance require more than general knowledge. Whatever difficulties might exist at the margins of “expert
advice and assistance,” petitioners’ proposed activities
fall squarely within its core. Because the term “expert
advice and assistance” clearly covers petitioners’ proposed activities, their as-applied vagueness challenge
must fail. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495;
Levy, 417 U.S. at 756.
3. Providing persons to work under the direction or control of the PKK and LTTE constitutes “personnel”

a. Petitioners argue (Br. 36-38) that the term “personnel” is unconstitutionally vague. The court of appeals correctly rejected that argument. See Pet. App.
26a-27a. The meaning of the term “personnel” was clear
to a person of ordinary intelligence even before IRTPA.
See Webster’s 1687 (defining “personnel” as “persons of
a particular (as professional or occupational) group”).
IRTPA further clarified the material-support statute, so
that it now provides:
No person may be prosecuted under this section in
connection with the term ‘personnel’ unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or
conspired to provide a foreign terrorist organization
with 1 or more individuals (who may be or include
himself ) to work under that terrorist organization’s
direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely independently of
the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals
or objectives shall not be considered to be working
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under the foreign terrorist organization’s direction
and control.
18 U.S.C. 2339B(h). Accordingly, conviction under that
provision requires a defendant to knowingly provide one
or more persons to work under or to supervise a terrorist organization. If an individual acts independently of
the organization, he cannot be held liable.
A person of ordinary intelligence would easily understand the statute’s distinction between concerted and
independent action. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (discussing, in connection with Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1,
“the basic distinction between concerted and independent action”). Just as, for instance, an ordinary person
understands the difference between “concerted effort by
more than one entity to fix prices or otherwise restrain
trade” and “independent activity by a single entity,”
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 266 (1986), so
too he will understand the difference between acting
under a foreign terrorist organization’s “direction or
control” and acting on his own. Indeed, the definition of
“personnel” is not significantly different from terms
used in other federal statutes that impose criminal liability on persons who act under another’s direction or
control, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 175b(d)(2)(G); 18 U.S.C.
951(d), or on those who manage, supervise, or organize
an operation or individual, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 225(a)(1);
18 U.S.C. 1169(b)(1); 18 U.S.C. 1960(a).
For that reason, courts have held since IRTPA’s enactment that the term “personnel” is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to criminal defendants’ intended
support to foreign terrorist organizations. See United
States v. Taleb-Jedi, 566 F. Supp. 2d 157, 182 (E.D.N.Y.
2008) (“[I]t is clear that the statute gives a person of
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ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited and it also provides explicit standards
for those applying it.”); United States v. Warsame,
537 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1017-1018 (D. Minn. 2008); United
States v. Shah, 474 F. Supp. 2d 492, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2007);
United States v. Awan, 459 F. Supp. 2d 167, 177-181
(E.D.N.Y. 2006); United States v. Marzook, 383 F. Supp.
2d 1056, 1063-1068 (N.D. Ill. 2005); cf. United States v.
Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182, 194 (W.D.N.Y. 2002)
(pre-IRTPA); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d
541, 574 (E.D.Va. 2002) (same).
b. Petitioners argue that “direction or control” could
“mean many things of potential, but uncertain, applicability.” Br. 36. But the statute is not vague simply because some cases may present a close question as to
whether a person is acting independently. That question
is no more than a factual issue to be resolved by the jury
in a particular case. See Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1846
(“What renders a statute vague is not the possibility
that it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether
the incriminating fact it establishes has been proved; but
rather the indeterminacy of precisely what that fact
is.”); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 223 (1961).
In some cases, proof of “direction or control” will be
clear; in other cases, it will not. But in no set of cases
will a reasonable jury be confused as to the factual question to be determined.
Petitioners’ hypotheticals (Br. 36-37) involving the
provision of legal or journalistic services to foreign terrorist organizations run aground on this basic point.
Whether a defendant works “under [a] terrorist organization’s direction or control,” 18 U.S.C 2339B(h), is necessarily a fact-dependent and context-specific question,
and reasonable factfinders may disagree about the an-
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swer in a particular case. But that does not mean the
question should not be assigned to such factfinders in
the first instance. To the contrary, the question whether
a defendant has acted under the “direction or control” of
another is properly directed to a jury in a particular
case, not to this Court in the guise of an as-applied
vagueness challenge. The vagueness doctrine steps in
only when a question is indeterminate, not when the
known facts make an intelligible question difficult to
answer.8
c. In any event, any vagueness at the margins of the
term “personnel” would not help petitioners. They say
that they seek to “engage in political advocacy on behalf
of the PKK and the Kurds before the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights and the United States Congress;
* * * write and distribute publications supportive of
the PKK and the cause of Kurdish liberation; * * *
advocate for the freedom of political prisoners in Turkey
8

Petitioners point (Br. 38) to a statement by government counsel in
a different case six years ago, before Congress amended the definition
of “personnel.” United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 360
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). The statement concerned the difference between joining a foreign terrorist organization and providing “personnel” to that
organization. As amended by IRTPA, the latter now requires a person
“to work under [the] organization’s direction or control,” 18 U.S.C.
2339B(h), and a person who becomes a member of an organization,
without more, does not perform “work” for that organization. Even
prior to the enactment of IRTPA, the government at oral argument before the en banc court of appeals disavowed its earlier statement. See
Media for Case (38:16-38:54 mark) (“He said, ‘You know it when you see
it.’ * * * I don’t know if he thought he was being humorous, but it
obviously is not the way the law should be read.”). The constitutionality
of the definition of “personnel” should not stand or fall on the basis of
an isolated (and subsequently disavowed) statement made in the heat
of oral argument. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 309 n.5
(2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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* * * ; and * * * assist PKK members at peace conferences and other meetings.” J.A. 58-59. Of course,
petitioners could conduct all but the last of those listed
activities “entirely independently” of the PKK and
LTTE, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(h), in which case their conduct
would not be criminal. But petitioners do not wish to do
so: they sought to enjoin enforcement of the term “personnel” so that they could coordinate those activities
with, and carry them out under the direction and control
of, the PKK and LTTE. Because those proposed coordinated activities clearly fall within the statutory definition of “personnel,” the court of appeals properly rejected petitioners’ as-applied challenge.
4. Helping the PKK and LTTE appear before national
and international representative bodies constitutes
“services”

a. The term “service” is also not unconstitutionally
vague. “Service” refers to “an act done for the benefit or at the command of another” or to “useful labor
that does not produce a tangible commodity.” Webster’s
2075. That concept is readily understood by ordinary
people. In other contexts, courts of appeals have found
similar language to be sufficiently clear to define the
scope of criminal liability. See Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Treasury Dep’t, 578 F.3d 1133,
1145-1148 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting vagueness challenge
to an Executive Order that permits the Secretary of the
Treasury to designate entities that provide “financial or
other services to or in support of ” acts of terrorism);
United States v. Hescorp, Heavy Equip. Sales Corp.,
801 F.2d 70, 73, 77 (2d Cir.) (rejecting vagueness challenge to regulations implementing an Executive Order
prohibiting any person from engaging in any “service
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contract” in Iran, because the language in the Executive
Order “gave * * * fair notice” of what was prohibited),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1018 (1986). The word is no less
easy to understand in the material-support statute.
Petitioners focus (Br. 34-35) on the portion of the
dictionary definition requiring that “an act [be] done for
the benefit * * * of another,” but ignore the statutory
requirement that a “service” be provided “to a foreign
terrorist organization.” 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1) (emphasis
added). That limitation requires a direct relationship
with the foreign terrorist organization that benefits
from the proferred service. See p. 22, supra. A speaker
or writer who acts independently of a foreign terrorist
organization may in fact benefit that organization, but
he does not “knowingly provide[] material support or
resources to a foreign terrorist organization” within the
meaning of the statute. Petitioners simply cannot reconcile themselves to the statute’s basic distinction between
independent and concerted action.
b. Whatever ambiguity petitioners might generate
from viewing the term “service” in isolation, the word is
unambiguous in context. Section 2339A(b)(1) forbids
providing a number of types of support to foreign terrorist organizations, including “currency or monetary
instruments or financial securities, financial services,
lodging, * * * safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, * * * and transportation.” The term “service” must be understood in the
context of those other types of material support.
See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575
(1995) (“[A] word is known by the company it keeps.”);
Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)
(“The maxim noscitur a sociis, * * * while not an ines-
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capable rule, is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of
unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.”). As this
list indicates, Congress was concerned with “service[s]”
that are rendered directly to a foreign terrorist organization, not to any and all acts that may be of some benefit.
Similarly, petitioners are incorrect (Br. 39) that the
term “service” should be read to include the types of
conduct expressly excluded from the definitions of
“training,” “expert advice or assistance,” and “personnel.” This Court interprets statutes to avoid constitutional doubts, not to create them. See, e.g., Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). Accordingly,
“the various provisions of the Act should be read in pari
materia,” United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 138 n.11 (1985), and the term “service” should not be expanded to cover types of conduct
expressly excluded by other statutory provisions. Petitioners cite (Br. 39) cases upholding vagueness challenges when the statutory text was “active[ly] misleading,” Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438 (1959), or issued
“[i]nexplicably contradictory commands,” ibid. (describing United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952)). Neither of those two circumstances is remotely present
here.
Moreover, even if the term “service” can plausibly be
read as petitioners suggest, it no less reasonably can be
interpreted to mean an action “done * * * at the command of ” that organization to further its goals and objectives. Webster’s 2075. Interpreted in that way, the
statute would raise no vagueness concern at all. It is
well-settled that “when ‘a statute is susceptible of two
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constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such
questions are avoided, [the Court’s] duty is to adopt the
latter.’ ” Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 555
(2002) (quoting United States ex rel. the Att’y Gen. of
the United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S.
366, 408 (1909)). The statute’s text plainly requires that
a “service” be rendered “to” a foreign terrorist organization (which requires a direct relationship). Any remaining ambiguity is easily avoided by interpreting the
statute to require that a “service” be done at the terrorist organization’s command or behest.9
c. Although their hypotheticals suggest otherwise
(Br. 34-35), petitioners do not seek to render an indirect
benefit to the PKK and LTTE. Rather, they want to
render benefit directly to those groups by coordinating
their actions. As petitioners explain, they seek to “assist[] the PKK in appearing before national and international representative bodies such as the United Nations
Human Rights Subcommission, the Council of Europe,
the United States Congress, and international human
rights conferences.” J.A. 98. In particular, petitioners
seek “to provide training and expert advice and assistance * * * on how to bring claims and appeals of
Kurds before the UN and other policy making bodies.”
J.A. 99. Petitioners’ proposed conduct therefore falls
squarely within the term “service” on any interpreta9

Petitioners claim that they are forced “to guess whether joining or
affiliating with a group is prohibited” by the term “service.” Br. 35.
But joining an organization is not usually thought of as providing a “service” to that organization. Petitioners remain free to join or affiliate
with the PKK or LTTE. See p. 59-60, infra. What petitioners may not
do is provide material support or resources to the organization,
regardless of whether they are members or affiliates.
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tion. Again, petitioners cannot prevail by pointing to
purported vagueness at the margins of the material-support statute, when their proposed activities rest comfortably within its core.
B. The Court Of Appeals Confused The Vagueness And
Overbreadth Doctrines

The decision of the court of appeals rested in large
part on the court’s view that prohibiting the provision of
any “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” or “service” to a terrorist group would violate the First Amendment. For example, the court reasoned that “training”
is vague because it could “be read to encompass speech
and advocacy protected by the First Amendment.” Pet.
App. 22a; see id. at 24a (“Because the ‘other specialized
knowledge’ portion of the ban on providing ‘expert advice or assistance’ continues to cover constitutionally
protected advocacy, we hold that it is void for vagueness.”); id. at 25a (holding that “service” is vague in part
“because it is easy to imagine protected expression that
falls within the bounds of the term ‘service’ ”) (first set
of internal quotation marks omitted).
Petitioners understandably make no effort to defend
that rationale, because the court of appeals’ analysis
erroneously conflated two separate constitutional doctrines: vagueness and overbreadth. If the court were
correct that “training” could “be read to encompass
speech and advocacy protected by the First Amendment,” Pet. App. 22a, then the statute might be unconstitutional, as a matter of substantive First Amendment
law, in some of its applications. And if those applications
were sufficiently numerous in relation to the legitimate
applications of the statute, then the statute would be
vulnerable to an overbreadth challenge. See Williams,
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128 S. Ct. at 1838 (“[W]e have vigorously enforced the
requirement that a statute’s overbreadth be substantial,
not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”); Virginia v. Hicks, 539
U.S. 113, 119-120 (2003).
Overbreadth and vagueness, however, are distinct
doctrines, and the coverage of a statute, by itself, has
nothing to do with whether its meaning is unclear.
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007)
(That a statute can be applied in many different situations “does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates
breadth.”); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114 (“A clear and precise enactment may nevertheless be ‘overbroad’ if in its
reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.”).
Accordingly, the court of appeals erred by conflating
petitioners’ claim under the Fifth Amendment (i.e., that
the statute is unconstitutionally vague) with their claims
under the First Amendment (i.e., that the statute unconstitutionally infringes on their rights of free speech and
association). For the reasons set forth earlier, the contested terms in the material-support statute all have a
clear meaning to an ordinary person, and the former
claim therefore lacks merit. And as shown in the next
part, the latter claims fare no better.
II. THE MATERIAL-SUPPORT STATUTE’S RESTRICTIONS
ON PROVIDING AID TO KNOWN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS DO NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Petitioners’ claims of content-based discrimination
(Br. 43-55), overbreadth (Br. 42-43), and violation of
associational rights (Br. 56-59) have no merit. The
material-support statute is a generally applicable regulation of conduct that only incidentally affects expressive
activity, rather than a content-based restriction on
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speech. Even assuming arguendo that certain applications of the statute to expression violate the First
Amendment, the statute is not overbroad because those
applications are not substantial in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. And the statute does not
prevent petitioners from joining or otherwise associating with foreign terrorist organizations. For those reasons, the lower courts, including the courts below, have
uniformly rejected arguments that the material-support
statute violates the First Amendment.
A. The Statute Is A Regulation Of Conduct That Only Incidentally And Permissibly Affects Expression

Petitioners argue (Br. 23-25, 43-50) that the
material-support statute is a content-based regulation of
speech subject to strict scrutiny. As the court of appeals
held, however, the statute is in fact a regulation of conduct, applying irrespective of any expressive content,
and is therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny under
O’Brien. See Pet. App. 28a; Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1135. The statute easily survives such
scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to advance important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of expression. Id. at 1135-1136.
1. Section 2339B regulates conduct without regard to its
expressive content

a. Petitioners attempt to frame the material-support
statute as a law aimed at “pure speech addressing political issues.” Br. 23; id. at 23-25. Nothing could be further from the truth. Petitioners remain free, as they say
that they wish, “to lobby Congress, to teach and advise
on human rights, to promote the peaceful resolution of
political disputes, and to advocate for the human rights
of minority populations.” Id. at 23. What petitioners

45
may not do under the statute is something different:
engage in certain activities in coordination with, or under the direction or control of, groups that they know
have been designated as terrorist organizations or have
engaged in terrorist activity. In enacting the materialsupport statute, Congress regulated a particular type of
conduct (i.e., providing direct aid to known terrorist
organizations), not a particular type of expression
(e.g., advocating for the advancement of human rights).
The prohibition on conduct set out in the statute applies
irrespective of whether a person conveys a particular
message or engages in any expression at all.
For that reason, petitioners’ citations (Br. 24, 40) of
cases involving content-based restrictions on speech
have no relevance here. Section 2339B does not target
expression at all, let alone expression of a certain content or viewpoint. It therefore bears no resemblance to
the laws that petitioners cite prohibiting the transmission of indecent or offensive telecommunications to minors, Reno, 521 U.S. at 871; the distribution of anonymous campaign literature, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995); the publication of offensive information about a person’s private affairs, Cox
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975); or the
use of vulgar language, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
16 (1971). Unlike those laws, Section 2339B does not
prohibit expression except incidentally, and does not
punish any person because he is conveying a particular
message.
Rather, Section 2339B aims at a certain type of conduct: the provision of material support or resources to
foreign terrorist organizations. The statute applies
whether the proferred aid takes the form of “property”
(like “currency or monetary instruments or financial
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securities, lodging, * * * safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, [or] explosives”) or
“service[s]” (like “financial services, * * * training,
expert advice or assistance, * * * personnel * * * ,
[or] transportation”). 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(1). The statute thus establishes a broad ban on providing any property or service, other than “medicine or religious materials,” to a known terrorist organization. Ibid. Sections
2339A and 2339B say nothing about speech, much less
about the content of any speaker’s message. See City of
L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[W]hether
a statute is content neutral or content based is something that can be determined on the face of it; if the statute describes speech by content then it is content
based.”). Those provisions, on their face, regulate specified activities in aid of terrorism.
Contrary to petitioners’ argument (Br. 42), the First
Amendment analysis is not altered because the statute
prohibits “training” and “expert advice or assistance,”
which usually are accomplished through the use of
words. Conspiracy is typically accomplished through
words; so too fraud, bribery, and extortion. Training or
providing expert advice to terrorists parallels those
longstanding crimes. That a particular course of conduct may be—or, indeed, invariably is—effectuated
through words does not control the constitutional analysis. The relevant inquiry in a case like this one is whether the statute at issue targets speech directly or instead
only incidentally restricts speech as part of regulating
harmful activity. See United States v. Albertini, 472
U.S. 675, 687 (1985) (“Application of a facially neutral
regulation that incidentally burdens speech satisfies the
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First Amendment” if it meets the O’Brien test.);
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 604 (2001)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part) (“This Court has long
recognized the need to differentiate between legislation
that targets expression and legislation that targets conduct for legitimate non-speech-related reasons but imposes an incidental burden on expression.”). The
material-support statute, as the court of appeals recognized, does the latter: it aims at the act of giving material support to terrorists—regardless whether accomplished through words and, if accomplished through
words, regardless of their expressive content. See Pet.
App. 28a (citing Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d
at 1135).
Nor does it matter to the constitutional analysis
whether, in cases in which material support to terrorists
takes the form of words, the words at issue are intrinsically blameworthy (e.g., training on how to build a bomb)
or seemingly benign (e.g., advice on international law
or computer programming). Petitioners even admit as
much. See Br. 45 (“[T]he statute’s prohibitions reach
even speech that is designed to discourage terrorism
and to promote only lawful, nonviolent activities.”). In
every instance, the statute’s aim is not the content or
viewpoint of the speech, but the act of aiding deadly terrorist organizations.
b. Eleven judges of the Ninth Circuit, sitting en
banc, unanimously rejected petitioners’ content-based
discrimination argument on this essential reasoning,
referring to an earlier panel opinion. See 393 F.3d at
902. That opinion, in turn, held that “the material support restriction here does not warrant strict scrutiny
because it is not aimed at interfering with the expressive
component of [petitioners’] conduct but at stopping aid
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to terrorist groups.” Humanitarian Law Project,
205 F.3d at 1135. It further held that “[i]ntermediate
scrutiny applies where, as here, ‘a regulation . . .
serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression.’”
Ibid. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791). Applying intermediate scrutiny, it concluded that the material-support
statute satisfies that standard. Id. at 1135-1136.
Likewise, the Fourth Circuit, also sitting en banc,
has rejected petitioners’ argument. See United States
v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (2004), vacated on other
grounds, 543 U.S. 1097, reinstated in relevant part, 405
F.3d 1034 (4th Cir. 2005). In Hammoud, the court held
that the material-support statute is a “facially neutral
statute [that] restricts some expressive conduct.” As
such, the court held, the statute is subject to intermediate scrutiny, which it satisfies. Id. at 329. The District
of Columbia and Seventh Circuits have rejected similar
claims. People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Department
of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1244-1245 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“It
is conduct and not communication that the statute controls.”); Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000,
1025-1027 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Under section 2339B, * * *
[defendants] may, with impunity, become members of
Hamas, praise Hamas for its use of terrorism, and vigorously advocate the goals and philosophies of Hamas.
Section 2339B prohibits only the provision of material
support (as that term is defined) to a terrorist organization.”); cf. Boim v. Holy Land Found . for Relief & Dev.,
549 F.3d 685, 700 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 458 (2009) (Holy Land). Petitioners do not
point to any decision of any court holding that the
material-support statute is a content-based restriction
on speech.
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2. Petitioners’ arguments that Section 2339B is a
content-based restriction on speech are meritless

a. Petitioners are correct (Br. 45) that the materialsupport statute is not a content-neutral restriction on
the time, place, or manner of their proposed speech. But
it does not follow, as petitioners argue, that the statute
then must be a content-based restriction on their
speech. In fact, as explained above, the statute fits into
neither of those categories of speech restrictions; it is
instead a generally applicable regulation of conduct that
only incidentally impinges on expression. This Court
has frequently upheld the application of such statutes to
criminalize or otherwise restrict some expression as part
of the class of targeted conduct. See Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997); Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611 (1985); O’Brien, 391
U.S. at 377. The Court has never insisted that such an
incidental restriction on speech, assuming it passes muster under the O’Brien test, also somehow incorporate
characteristics of time, place, or manner regulation.
b. Petitioners assert that “a ban on speech to a chosen audience”—i.e., foreign terrorist organizations—
“triggers strict First Amendment scrutiny.” Br. 46.
Again, the material-support statute is importantly different from the laws cited by petitioners (Br. 46 n.24)
restricting editorials by educational broadcasting stations, FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 366
(1984), or electioneering communications by unions and
corporations, McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n,
540 U.S. 93, 204 (2003). Unlike those laws, Section
2339B does not restrict a particular kind of speech, by a
particular set of speakers, for the benefit of the public.
Petitioners are free to communicate with the public, as
the speakers wished to do in the cases that petitioners
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cite, about ideas held by the PKK and LTTE. And just
as importantly, petitioners are free to join and communicate with the members of the PKK or LTTE, so long as
they do not use that communication as a vehicle for conveying material assistance. That is because Section
2339B regulates not speakers attempting to reach particular audiences, but providers of property and services
seeking to assist organizations defined by their terrorist
conduct.
c. Petitioners contend (Br. 48-50) that the statute is
content-based because it prohibits material support only
to certain foreign terrorist organizations (as designated
by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General). The
Secretary of State, however, has the authority to designate such an organization only if she finds that it “engages in terrorist activity” that “threatens the security
of United States nationals or the national security of the
United States.” 8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(1).10 In other words,
the designation itself is based on groups’ conduct, not on
the content of their speech or the nature of their political beliefs. Cf. Pet. Br. 49-50 (hypothesizing a statute
that favored particular political parties). Congress thus
did not prohibit speech in support of certain disfavored
speakers; it instead prohibited conduct in support of
certain dangerous actors. And petitioners point to no
evidence in this as-applied challenge that the PKK and
LTTE were designated as terrorist organizations based

10

In the event that an organization wishes to dispute the basis for its
designation, it may file a petition for review in the District of Columbia
Circuit. 8 U.S.C. 1189(c). Here, the LTTE challenged its designation,
which the District of Columbia Circuit upheld. People’s Mojahedin
Org. of Iran, 182 F.3d at 24-25.
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on anything other than their commission of terrorist
acts.
Similarly, petitioners argue (Br. 48) that the material-support statute is content-based because its terms
distinguish between various types of conduct. For instance, the term “training” prohibits imparting a specific skill but not general knowledge; and the term “expert advice or assistance” applies only to scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. But this Court
“[has] never held, or suggested, that it is improper to
look at the content of an oral or written statement in
order to determine whether a rule of law applies to a
course of conduct.” Hill, 530 U.S. at 721. Congress distinguished between general and specialized knowledge
in order to identify the types of training or expert assistance that—like providing safehouses or weapons—are
particularly likely to advance the goals and objectives of
terrorist groups. Classifications between forms of support to organizations, based on such neutral and legitimate governmental interests, do not become contentbased restrictions on speech because they incidentally
affect some but not all expressive activity. See Ward,
491 U.S. at 791 (“A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral,
even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or
messages but not others.”).11

11

Petitioners also claim (Br. 48) that the statute is content-based because it permits the provision of medicine and religious materials. See
18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(1). The court of appeals correctly found that Congress “is entitled to strike such delicate balances,” in recognition of humanitarian and religious values, “without giving up its ability to prohibit
other types [of] assistance which would promote terrorism.” Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1136 n.4.
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3. Section 2339B is narrowly tailored to advance important governmental interests

a. Because it regulates conduct and only incidentally
restricts speech, the material-support statute is subject
to intermediate scrutiny. See Albertini, 472 U.S. at
687-688; O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The lower courts in
this case, joining every court to face the issue, concluded
that Section 2339B easily survives such scrutiny: it is
within Congress’s power to enact; it promotes an important (indeed, compelling) government interest; it is
aimed at stopping aid to terrorists, rather than at suppressing free expression or association; and it is reasonably tailored, restricting expressive rights no more than
is necessary. See Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d
at 1135-1136; see also Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 329
(“Section 2339B satisfies all four prongs of the O’Brien
test.”).
Petitioners understandably do not dispute that Section 2339B satisfies the first, second, and third prongs of
the O’Brien test. First, Congress “clearly has the power
to enact laws restricting the dealings of United States
citizens with foreign entities; such regulations have been
upheld in the past over a variety of constitutional challenges.” Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1135
(citing cases). In their brief, petitioners advance (Br. 49,
70) hypotheticals involving the regulation of speech in
the domestic context. But the material-support statute
is fundamentally different: it restricts individuals’ ability to act in concert with foreign entities. See, e.g., DKT
Mem’l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275,
295 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he right of Americans to associate with nonresident aliens is not an absolute.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Such a regula-
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tion is within “[t]he constitutional power of Congress.”
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
Second, “the government has a legitimate interest in
preventing the spread of international terrorism, and
there is no doubt that that interest is substantial.” Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1135; see Wayte,
470 U.S. at 611 (“Few interests can be more compelling
than a nation’s need to ensure its own security.”). Since
2001, the United States has charged approximately 150
defendants with violations of the material-support provision of 18 U.S.C. 2339B, and to date approximately 75
defendants have been convicted. Several of those prosecutions have involved the provision of “training,” “expert
advice or assistance,” “personnel” or “service,” see
United States v. Kassir, No. 04 CR 356 (JFK), 2009 WL
2913651, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2009) (defendant convicted for providing jihad training to young men and
disseminating training manuals to terrorist groups,
among them al Qaeda), including to the LTTE, one of
the terrorist organizations at issue here, see United
States v. Kandasamy, No. 06 CR 616 (RJD), 2008 WL
2660610, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008) (alleging that a
defendant “assisted LTTE members in procuring military weaponry worth millions of dollars, including missiles, firearms, explosives, artillery and radar”), aff ’d,
No. 08-3589-CR, 2009 WL 692113 (2d Cir. Mar. 18,
2009). Those prosecutions, and others like them under
the material-support statute, have prevented substantial
harm to the nation.
Third, the government’s interest in preventing the
spread of terrorism and the occurrence of terrorist acts
“is unrelated to suppressing free expression because
[Section 2339B] restricts the actions of those who wish
to provide material support to [terrorist] groups, not the
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expression of those who advocate or believe the ideas
that the groups support[].” Humanitarian Law Project,
205 F.3d at 1135; see Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 329
(“Hammoud is free to advocate in favor of Hizballah or
its political objectives—§ 2339B does not target such
advocacy.”); Taleb-Jedi, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 177 (“Defendant remains free to sympathize with or advocate in favor of the PMOI.”). In enacting Section 2339B, Congress prohibited the forms of support to terrorist organizations that strengthen their capacity to commit acts
of violence and destruction. Congress did not prohibit
individuals from joining terrorist groups, expressing
solidarity with them, or even inciting others to engage
in terrorist conduct. And petitioners have not presented
any evidence that the statute would be applied in this
case for any purpose related to suppressing expression.
The third prong of O’Brien is thus also met.
b. Petitioners dispute (Br. 65) that Section 2339B is
tailored to its goal, but their claim that Congress was
“[w]ithout evidence” to support Section 2339B’s prohibition ignores the rationale established in the legislative
record. Ibid. There, Congress found that terrorist organizations “have established footholds within ethnic or
resident alien communities in the United States” and
can “operate under the cloak of a humanitarian or charitable exercise.” H.R. Rep. No. 383, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. 43 (1995) (1995 House Report) (report on predecessor bill). Congress further found that “foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted
by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such
an organization facilitates that conduct.” AEDPA
§ 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1247.
In particular, Congress determined that “the fungibility of financial resources and other types of material
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support” would permit individuals “to supply funds,
goods, or services to an organization,” which would
“help[] defray the cost to the terrorist organization of
running the ostensibly legitimate activities. This in turn
frees an equal sum that can then be spent on terrorist
activities.” 1995 House Report 81. As Congress explained, “[t]here is no other mechanism, other than an
outright prohibition on contributions, to effectively prevent such organizations from using funds raised in the
United States to further their terrorist activities
abroad.” Id. at 45. As the court of appeals concluded,
“[i]t follows that all material support given to such organizations aids their unlawful goals.” Humanitarian
Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1136.
According to the State Department, “[t]he experience and analysis of the U.S. government agencies
charged with combating terrorism strongly supports
this congressional finding.” J.A. 133. “[I]t is highly
likely that any material support to these organizations
will ultimately inure to the benefit of their criminal, terrorist functions,” because they “do not maintain organizational ‘firewalls’ that would prevent or deter such
sharing and commingling of support and benefits.”
J.A. 133, 135 (emphasis omitted). Moreover, to the extent that some terrorist groups have “political or humanitarian components,” they use those components “to
support the establishment of logistical infrastructure
(communications, housing and the like) and intelligence
networks,” J.A. 134, “to recruit personnel to carry out
terrorist operations,” and “to provide support to criminal terrorists and their families in aid of such operations,” J.A. 135.
Petitioners claim (Br. 12, 65) that they intend to discourage terrorism, but their motives are irrelevant in
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light of Congress’ findings. In Congress’ view, providing
assistance, whether tangible or intangible, frees resources that terrorists can and often do allocate to criminal and violent activities. J.A. 136-137. And even the
provision of seemingly benign services (like legal advice
or communications assistance) bolsters a terrorist organization’s efficacy and strength in a community, thus
undermining this nation’s efforts to delegitimize and
weaken these groups. See Holy Land, 549 F.3d at 698
(“Anyone who knowingly contributes to the nonviolent
wing of an organization that he knows to engage in terrorism is knowingly contributing to the organization's
terrorist activities.”).
Although petitioners previously sought to provide
funds to the PKK and LTTE (Br. 16 n.10), they now concede that the statute is constitutional as applied to “financial aid and non-speech support.” Id. at 55. It is
certainly true that funds given to terrorist organizations, even for avowedly political or humanitarian purposes, can be used to support terrorist activities. See
ADL Amicus Br. 19-31 (detailing use of humanitarian
aid for terrorist efforts by the PKK, LTTE and Hamas).
But it is equally true, in Congress’ view, that other types
of support—including personnel, training, and other
services—can have similarly harmful consequences for
American interests. Petitioners attempt to secondguess that judgment, but this Court should not. That is
especially so because this case involves sensitive national security and foreign affairs interests, to which a
heightened degree of deference to Congress and the
Executive Branch is warranted. Humanitarian Law
Project, 205 F.3d at 1136 (“Because the judgment of how
best to achieve that end [of combating terrorism] is
strongly bound up with foreign policy considerations, we
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must allow the political branches wide latitude in selecting the means to bring about the desired goal.”); see
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984); Haig v. Agee,
453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981).
Likewise, petitioners conceded in the lower courts
that the government could prohibit all forms of material
support to al Qaeda. See Pet. C.A. Br. 32 n.13; Media
for Case (13:53-14:10). Petitioners’ argument thus
amounts to a claim that Congress may not expand the
prohibition beyond al Qaeda to other terrorist groups.
Whatever the basis for that argument, it cannot have to
do with vagueness, content-discrimination, or associational rights. In fact, petitioners’ rationale must be that
aid to al Qaeda inevitably supports terrorist activities,
while aid to other terrorist organizations does not. But
Congress reached a different judgment, and that judgment is the one entitled to respect. This Court should
reject petitioners’ attempt to cloak in constitutional garb
what petitioners’ own arguments reveal to be an attack
on legislative policy.
B. The Statute Is Not Overbroad

To be overbroad, a statute must prohibit a “substantial” amount of protected expression, judged in absolute
terms and in relation to the law’s plainly legitimate
sweep. Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119-120; see Williams,
128 S. Ct. at 1838. Even assuming Section 2339B has any
unconstitutional applications, they are insufficiently substantial, either in absolute number or in relation to the
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep, to render the statute
unconstitutionally overbroad. For that reason, lower
courts have uniformly rejected overbreadth challenges
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to Section 2339B.12 That uniform conclusion is not surprising, given the nature of the material-support statute.
As this Court has observed, “[r]arely, if ever, will an
overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or to
conduct necessarily associated with speech (such as
picketing or demonstrating).” Hicks, 539 U.S. at 124.
The court of appeals noted Section 2339B’s “many
legitimate applications.” Pet. App. 28a. For instance,
“[it] can legitimately be applied to criminalize facilitation of terrorism in the form of providing foreign terrorist organizations with income, weapons, or expertise in
constructing explosive devices.” Ibid. Petitioners themselves see no constitutional difficulty in applying the
statute to “material support in the form of financial aid
and other non-speech support.” Br. 55. That concession
is fatal to their overbreadth claim. It means, as the
court below held, that “although [petitioners] may be
able to identify particular instances of protected speech
that may fall within the statute, those instances are not
substantial when compared to the legitimate applications of [S]ection 2339B(a).” Pet. App. 29a. At the least,
petitioners make no effort to demonstrate that any
overbreadth is substantial in relation to Section 2339B’s
plainly legitimate sweep.
Moreover, as this Court has explained, “there are
substantial social costs created by the overbreadth doctrine when it blocks application of a law to constitutionally unprotected speech, or especially to constitutionally
12

See, e.g., Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 330; Taleb-Jedi, 566 F. Supp. 2d
at 185; Warsame, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1016; Shah, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 499
n.6; Awan, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 180; United States v. Assi, 414 F. Supp.
2d 707, 717 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 1062-1063;
United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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unprotected conduct.” Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119; see
Pet. App. 28a. If petitioners were correct that the
material-support statute is overbroad on its face, then
the government would not be able to enforce the statute
in any of its applications. The court of appeals rightly
recognized that such a holding “would potentially be
placing our nation in danger of future terrorist attacks.”
Id. at 29a.
C. The Statute Does Not Infringe Petitioners’ Right Of
Association

Likewise, the court of appeals properly rejected petitioners’ argument (Br. 56-59) that the material-support
statute targets association protected under the First
Amendment: “The statute does not prohibit being a
member of one of the designated groups or vigorously
promoting and supporting the political goals of the
group. [Petitioners] are even free to praise the groups
for using terrorism as a means of achieving their ends.
What [the statute] prohibits is the act of giving material
support, and there is no constitutional right to facilitate
terrorism by giving terrorists the weapons and explosives with which to carry out their grisly missions.” Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1133; see
Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 329 (“Hammoud’s argument fails
because § 2339B does not prohibit mere association; it
prohibits the conduct of providing material support to a
designated [foreign terrorist organization].”).
Indeed, Congress took special care not to infringe
upon associational rights. Recognizing that “[t]he First
Amendment protects one’s right to associate with
groups that are involved in both legal and illegal activities,” 1995 House Report 43, Congress observed that the
statutory ban “only affects one’s contribution of financial
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or material resources” because “[t]he First Amendment’s protection of the right of association does not
carry with it the ‘right’ to finance terrorist, criminal activities,” id. at 44. Congress made clear, however, that
“[t]hose inside the United States will continue to be free
to advocate, think, and profess the attitudes and philosophies of the foreign organizations.” Id. at 45. Accordingly, “[t]he basic protection of free association afforded
individuals under the First Amendment remains in
place.” Id. at 44.
Petitioners cite (Br. 57 n.30) a number of cases involving attempts to attach civil or criminal sanctions to
membership in the Communist Party. Those cases hold
that attaching liability to membership in an organization
requires proof of specific intent to further that group’s
unlawful (rather than its lawful) activities. See United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262, 265-266 (1967);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of the State
of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 609-610 (1967); Noto v. United
States, 367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961). But that specific
intent requirement applies only when “liability [is] imposed by reason of association alone.” NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982).
Here, Section 2339B does not prevent petitioners from
becoming members of the PKK and LTTE or impose
any sanction on them for doing so. The provision sanctions an entirely different activity, which need not and
often does not have any relation to membership.
Petitioners rely (Br. 57-58) extensively on De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), which set aside a state
criminal conviction “for merely assisting at a meeting
called by the Communist Party at which nothing unlawful was done or advocated.” Id. at 357. But the only
assistance involved in that case was advocacy of the
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Communist Party and its views. As this Court explained, “peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime.” Id. at 365. Section 2339B is fully
consistent with this principle: it does not prevent petitioners from peaceably assembling with members of the
PKK and LTTE for lawful discussion. It prevents the
separate step of rendering material support, in the form
of property or services, to these groups based on their
demonstrated willingness to commit acts of terror
rather than on their political views.
Finally, petitioners argue (Br. 62-63), in reliance on
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), and
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), that Section 2339B
directly regulates expressive association. In Dale, this
Court found that the Boy Scouts of America was “an
expressive association” and that a statute forbidding its
exclusion of gays and lesbians would “significantly affect
its expression.” 530 U.S. at 656. The Court therefore
concluded that the statute “directly and immediately
affect[ed] associational rights,” requiring the application
of strict scrutiny. Id. at 659; see Elrod, 427 U.S. at 363
n.17 (plurality opinion) (finding that the political patronage dismissals at issue sought to control “association
and belief per se”). By contrast, Section 2339B does not
regulate the membership of any organization, expressive
or otherwise. Nor does Section 2339B compel any organization to convey a message at odds with its fundamental beliefs, as did the statute in Dale. See 530 U.S. at
653-654. Section 2339B prohibits only the provision of
aid to terrorists, and to the extent it burdens associational rights at all, it does so only incidentally.
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III. THE MATERIAL-SUPPORT STATUTE’S RESTRICTIONS
ON PROVIDING AID DO NOT REQUIRE SPECIFIC INTENT TO FURTHER THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION’S UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES

1. Before the court of appeals, petitioners argued
that the material-support statute imposes “guilt by association” in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause unless it is interpreted to require specific
intent to further a terrorist organization’s unlawful activities. See Pet. C.A. Br. 19-36; Pet. C.A. Reply Br.
11-19.13 Petitioners made the same argument in passing
in their cross-petition to this Court. See Cross-Pet. 11
& n.10. In their opening brief, however, petitioners
abandon that argument. Nowhere do they argue that
the statute violates due process because it imposes guilt
by association. To be sure, petitioners assert in a footnote that they “have preserved the argument[],” Br. 43
n.23, but that reference is insufficient to justify this
Court’s review. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 735 n.24 (2004) (“[Respondent’s] brief contains one
footnote seeking to incorporate by reference [certain]
arguments * * * before the Court of Appeals. That is
not enough to raise the question fairly, and we do not
consider it.”) (internal citation omitted).
Petitioners now raise a different avoidance argument. Rather than claim that the material-support statute violates due process if not interpreted to require
13

The lower courts rejected petitioners’ argument that the materialsupport statute imposes guilt by association. See Pet. App. 13a-19a; id.
at 18a (“In sum, because section 2339B does not impose ‘vicarious
criminal liability,’ due process is satisfied without proof of specific intent
to further the organization’s illegal goals.”); id. at 19a (“Because there
is no Fifth Amendment due process violation, we affirm the district
court on this issue.”).
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specific intent, petitioners contend (Br. 65-69 & n.32)
that this Court can avoid resolving all of petitioners’
constitutional claims by construing the statute to require specific intent. The lower courts had no opportunity to address that contention. And this Court should
decline to address an argument raised for the first
time—after 11 years of litigation, id. at 5a—in petitioners’ opening brief. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009) (“This Court * * * is one
of final review, not of first view.”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see NCAA v. Smith, 525
U.S. 459, 470 (1999); United States v. Bestfoods, 524
U.S. 51, 72-73 (1998).
2. In any event, construing the statute to require
specific intent would not avoid resolution of petitioners’
constitutional claims. Petitioners’ vagueness claim under the Fifth Amendment would remain, because requiring a heightened mens rea does nothing to clarify what
actus reus violates the statute. For example, the term
“training,” as defined by the statute, prohibits imparting
a specific skill but not general knowledge to a foreign
terrorist organization. If petitioners are correct that
there is no intelligible difference between those two
acts, then even someone who intends to further unlawful
terrorist activity cannot be certain when his instruction
has strayed into forbidden territory. Moreover, petitioners’ facial overbreadth claim under the First Amendment apparently would remain, because petitioners
maintain that their construction, although protecting
their own activities, “would not necessarily save the statute’s constitutionality in every context.” Br. 66 n.32
(emphasis omitted). Petitioners’ proposed avoidance
strategy thus fails to deliver its purported benefits.
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3. a. Moreover, as the court of appeals explained,
the strategy is unavailable because the material-support
statute simply does not require specific intent to further
unlawful terrorist activities. Pet. App. 13a-19a; see
Scales, 367 U.S. at 211 (“Although this Court will often
strain to construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to
the point of perverting the purpose of a statute.”). This
Court has “long recognized that determining the mental
state required for commission of a federal crime requires ‘construction of the statute and . . . inference of
the intent of Congress.’ ” Staples v. United States, 511
U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (quoting United States v. Balint,
258 U.S. 250, 253 (1922)). In IRTPA, Congress amended
the material-support statute to make the scienter requirement unmistakable: “a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization * * * , that the organization has engaged or
engages in terrorist activity * * * , or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism.” 18 U.S.C.
2339B(a)(1). Petitioners’ proposed specific intent requirement is flatly inconsistent with Congress’ express
scienter requirement.
Congress’ rejection of a specific intent requirement
is even clearer when Section 2339B (which prohibits providing material support to foreign terrorist organizations) is placed alongside Section 2339A (which prohibits
providing material support to terrorists) and Section
2339C (which prohibits financing terrorism). In both
Sections 2339A and 2339C, Congress required the specific intent to further acts of terrorism. See 18 U.S.C.
2339A(a); 18 U.S.C. 2339C(a)(1). Indeed, Section
2339A(a) has precisely the specific intent requirement
that petitioners urge here: it prohibits “provid[ing] ma-
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terial support or resources * * * , knowing or intending
that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out” various criminal acts. If Congress had intended
the same requirement to apply in Section 2339B, it could
and would have said so. See Warsame, 537 F. Supp. 2d
at 1013 (“Congress’s inclusion of an explicit mens rea
requirement in § 2339A strongly suggests that it chose
not to include a specific intent requirement in
§ 2339B.”).
Indeed, Congress added IRTPA’s scienter requirement in the face of conflicting judicial decisions on the
subject. Whereas some decisions had held that the prior
version of the statute required only knowledge that the
donee organization was a designated foreign terrorist
organization or engaged in terrorist activities, see
352 F.3d at 400; see also Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 342 &
n.12, other decisions had interpreted the statute to require the specific intent to further the organization’s
unlawful activities, see United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F.
Supp. 2d 1322, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 2004); cf. Hammoud, 381
F.3d at 374-380 (Gregory, J., dissenting). Congress is
presumed aware of the legal backdrop against which it
acts, Cannon v. University of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696-697
(1979), and here Congress’ decision not to require specific intent to further a terrorist organization’s unlawful
activities was specifically intended to settle the judicial
conflict.
b. Petitioners rely (Br. 66-69) for their approach on
Scales, supra. That case concerned a clause in the
Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. 2385, prohibiting membership in
“any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach,
advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of
any [domestic] government by force or violence; * * *
knowing the purposes thereof.” This Court held that a
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member can violate that clause only if he possesses
“knowledge of the [group’s] illegal advocacy and a specific intent to bring about violent overthrow.” Scales,
367 U.S. at 220.
Once again, petitioners attempt to equate the material-support statute with a prohibition on membership.
But as the court of appeals explained, Scales is importantly different from this case. Pet. App. 16a. Unlike
Section 2339B, the Smith Act aims directly at freedom
of association. In that context, specific intent is necessary to distinguish protected association from unprotected (and potentially violent) conduct. See Scales,
367 U.S. at 229; ibid. (“If there were a similar blanket
prohibition of association with a group having both legal
and illegal aims, there would indeed be a real danger
that legitimate political expression or association would
be impaired.”). By contrast, Section 2339B does not
target First Amendment rights, and “does not proscribe
membership in or association with the terrorist organizations.” Pet. App. 16a. Rather, it targets a form of
conduct—i.e., the provision of material support or resources to foreign terrorist organizations—that does not
merit special constitutional protection. And unlike the
Smith Act, Section 2339B specifies the knowledge required to make such conduct criminal: knowledge that
the recipient is a designated foreign terrorist organization or engages in terrorist activities. No element of
specific intent is therefore necessary to separate wrongful from innocent conduct. See Carter v. United States,
530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000) (requiring courts “to read into
a statute only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent conduct”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed insofar as it held certain terms in Sections 2339A
and 2339B unconstitutionally vague and in all other respects affirmed.
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